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Sen. Wayne Morse:

"WHAT MORE CAN WE DO TO WIN AN HONORABLE PEACE IN ASIA?"—REMARKS OF SENATOR WAYNE MORSE, AT UCLA, LOS ANGELES, CALIF., SEPTEMBER 24, 1965

To judge where American foreign policy is heading requires that first we look to see what it is, and where it has been. Certainly the 16 years following World War II saw the development of the objectives that guide our policies today, although the techniques and geographic locations have changed, and so have the circumstances that gave birth to it.

The final months of the war brought destruction to much of Western Europe's industrial plant, transportation, and housing. But more than that, the collapse of Germany left a huge void in Europe's political organization, because the Nazi occupation or control of virtually the entire continent, including 12 countries in East and West Europe, had destroyed their indigenous political leaders and political systems.

The Soviet Army moved into that part of the void that was nearest to the Soviet Union.

Western armies moved into the rest, and both began the effort to reconstruct their respective halves of Europe in their own image, or at least into regions where their interests would prevail.

In the late 1940's, we began to feel that the physical presence of overwhelming Soviet military strength on the continent could not be offset by the skeleton American military presence, even backed up by atomic weapons, which we then possessed exclusively. The Greek-Turkish aid program was undertaken in 1947 when the civil war which was Greece's legacy of the occupation threatened it with Communist domination. The fall of Czechoslovakia into the Soviet sphere by means of a political coup, inspired the United States to try to organize the remainder of Western Europe into a much tighter and more dynamic entity.

We began with the Marshall plan for economic reconstruction; we followed it up with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization for military defense. Into the economic revival and military defenses of Europe we poured \$40 billion which has not yet been repaid, plus another \$7 billion which has. Half a million U.S. troops were sent to Europe to form the nucleus of NATO's military force, most of them still there.

Thus, we undertook what was called the containment policy, whereby we built a ring of pro-American governments around the Soviet Union, designed to prevent its further expansion. In the mid-1950's, the ring was extended under the Eisenhower doctrine into the Middle East, and the economic aid program was followed by the Baghdad Pact for military defense.

But with the extension of the containment theory into the Middle East, this American policy began to encounter circumstances that had not prevailed in Europe. In Europe, we had repaired and reconstructed. We had put together economic systems disrupted by war, and encouraged the rebuilding of political systems also disrupted by war and occupation. The military alliance under NATO was a holding action to permit economic and political action.

But in the Middle East, Latin America, Africa, and most urgently in Asia, we are not rebuilding disrupted nations. We are not dealing with nations of established economic customs and habits; we are not dealing with nations whose heritage and traditions we have shared for generations. We are dealing with nations, some old and some new, but all struggling with the multiple problems of exploding populations and exploding demands of those populations for greater material benefits, even while they are developing the institutions of self-government.

The Marshall plan had a beginning and an end. But economic development, as opposed to reconstruction, is open-ended. Moreover, the virtual dissolution of NATO, the Greek-Turkish dispute over Cyprus, and the reversion of Greece from a model of political stability and economic growth into its pre-Truman doctrine days of factional strife, are all warnings that only where the threat of communism is overpowering and imminent is there the adhesive to hold nations together behind an American objective.

In Europe, the threat of Soviet expansion has just about disappeared. With it has disappeared the huddling of nations under the American umbrella. Germany continues to be our chief ally in Europe, but only because it is Germany that still has the greatest unfinished business with the Soviet Union.

Even in Europe, the objectives of nationalism are dominant. We deplore them; we think Greece and Turkey are stupid to quarrel over Cyprus, when the net result is a drawing of Russia into the area.

So, too, do we condemn the nationalism

that constantly threatens an Arab-Israeli war in the Middle East and which is now shedding blood in Kashmir.

Yet how many Americans understand that we deplore and belittle all these nationalisms only because they interfere and detract from our own?

It is a glorification of American policy to call it one of saving the world for freedom. What it means is that we view any advance by communism as a threat to the United States. There have been a few exceptions. We deplored the repression of the Hungarian rebellion, but we did nothing about it, and we deplored the Chinese takeover of Tibet and its seizure of territory from India, but did nothing about those advances, either, mainly because we did not think that from the geographic standpoint they posed a threat to the security of the United States.

But with those few exceptions, there is little real estate in the world where we view Communist control as anything but a threat to ourselves.

In essence, our policy throughout the world is also one of nationalism. In its name we have spent \$109 billion in foreign aid; we alone, of all the nations of the world, maintain tens of thousands of troops abroad in much the same fashion that British troops were stationed all over the world in the heyday of Empire. And but for the few remaining British bases at Aden, Singapore, and Gibraltar, only the United States maintains sea, air, and naval bases outside its own territory.

These are the trappings of our own nationalism. To them, we have for 20 years subordinated and belittled all other nationalisms. We have regarded them as a nuisance, representing only the willful fancies of nations that can afford to indulge in them only because of the protection of the American military umbrella.

PROBLEMS POSED BY NATIONALISM IN ASIA

In the last 5 years, our American foreign policy objectives have been the most seriously thwarted by nationalism in Asia. Twenty years ago, Japan lay defeated; but not before she had defeated permanently the exploitation and domination of Asia by Western Powers. There was little welcome given to the Japanese conquerors by indigenous people, except in those colonies like the Dutch East Indies where imperialism had shown its worst face. Sukarno was a collaborator with the Japanese in the interest of ousting the Dutch.

But whether they were met by collaborators or by native resistance, the Japanese threw out the British, the French, the Dutch, and even the Americans from the Philippines. They proved it could be done, and having proved it, white domination was never re-established. The French tried to reenter Indochina, but after 8 costly years, gave up the struggle. Elsewhere, the transition to independence was accomplished with less violence.

This, too, left a huge vacuum that posed new problems for the United States. The withdrawal of both Japan and the West left many new nations which totally lacked their own economic and political systems. We promptly organized more defense pacts with the thought of providing these nations with the same sort of U.S. military umbrella under which to huddle while they stabilized themselves. But this time the partners were the white nations who had a continued interest in the affairs of Asia. Only Pakistan and the Philippines joined the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. The other Asian countries of the area wanted no part of it. For them, their internal problems were paramount and they could best be approached by a nationalism that cannot endure any association with the West that could be interpreted as domination by the West.

Moreover, hundreds of years of religious and ethnic conflicts made the NATO unity

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style impossible. Today, they dominate events in Asia. Moslem versus Hindu in the subcontinent; Chinese versus Malayan in Malaysia; Vietnamese versus Chinese in Indochina. And today there is, I submit, only one overriding outside issue on which these people agree, and that is that they never again are going to be dominated by white people, be they American or western European.

These aspects of nationalism in Asia are factors the United States will ignore at its great peril. For 11 years, we have tried to maintain a government of our choosing in South Vietnam. As it weakened almost in inverse proportion to the money and military equipment we poured into it, the support for our policy among other nations in the area also declined.

The real powers in Asia are: China, with over 700 million people; the Soviet Union, which most of us have forgotten occupies a huge portion of the Asian continent; India, with its more than 480 million; Pakistan with 100 million; Indonesia, with 100 million and the most extensive natural resources of southern Asia; and Japan, with 100 million people and the greatest industrial capacity of Asia.

Not one of these countries has joined us in the fighting in Vietnam; of them, only the Japanese Government gives us any verbal support, and that in defiance of the great preponderance of her public opinion.

Are we fighting in Vietnam to save Asia from Communist China, or from communism of any kind? If so, then why are not these major nations of the region helping us? Why does our only support come from the few small countries of Thailand, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines, at least two of them totally dependent upon the American defense establishment for their continued existence?

Even of the small nations of Asia, where are the famous dominoes which were supposed to fall only if the United States failed to keep a vague commitment to President Diem of South Vietnam?

Of these dominoes, Burma opted out of the American scheme of things in 1958 when CIA activities in her country became onerous. Two years ago, even as we were beginning to proclaim our increased military commitment to South Vietnam, Cambodia told us to take our various economic aid and military programs and get out. Indonesia draws steadily closer to China as an ally in ousting the last white people from Asia.

And after all the pronouncements from the Secretary of State, from the Secretary of Defense, from the White House staff, from President Johnson himself, after an unequalled public relations campaign to sell to the American people and to the Communists in Asia that Americans would never, never leave South Vietnam and the rest of Asia to its fate, the mayor of Singapore led his country out of the Malaysian Federation and undertook to insult the United States.

Mayor Lee of Singapore is now a head of state. Like all other political leaders in Asia he knows the key to leadership there is to oppose not just the colonialism that died a decade ago, but what looks to many Asians like a new American effort to dominate the affairs of Asia for our own national purposes. Anti-Americanism is becoming the one thing on which a politician in Asia can rally support.

So Mayor Lee reached back 5 years to reveal and publicize one of the uglier efforts of the Central Intelligence Agency to subvert his country. And although he is willing to allow Britain to continue operating its bases there on his terms, he makes it clear that Americans will never be allowed to take over those bases.

The breakup of the Malaysian Federation, which may break up into more pieces before the process is finished, marked another failure of Western policy. Malaysia was carefully constructed by the British to join together a group of former colonies so balanced ethnically as to prevent the domination of the Federation by any one of them. British economic interests continued to dominate the Federation, and its military establishment "east of Suez" is founded on it.

But the British, too, failed to consider the depth of local rivalries, which finally led the Moslem Malays to force out the Chinese city of Singapore. Now, the future of Britain "east of Suez" is in total jeopardy and so, of course, is the American position in Vietnam.

You will not hear any of this described, much less admitted in official Washington. The Washington policymakers who prescribed our military commitment in Vietnam as the way to save all of Asia, do not even comment on the failure of the great Asian powers to support us, on the rejection of American aid and U.S. bases by Burma and Cambodia, on the violent anti-Americanism of Indonesia, on the breakup of the Malaysian Federation, nor on the war between India and Pakistan.

Here, in this latest affront to American interests in Asia, is another opportunity for Americans to understand that we cannot arrange the affairs of Asia. The centuries of animosity between Moslems and Hindus resulted in the slaughter of tens of thousands of people at the time India gained its independence and had to be divided into India and Pakistan. Even after these communal slaughters and after the exchange of population that saw millions of people leave their homes, the hatred continues almost unabated. Communal riots killed hundreds more in India only a year ago. To both sides, Kashmir is a sentimental symbol of their rivalry. It is really not indigenous to either India or Pakistan; but it lacks sufficient population to govern itself.

So, for 18 years it has stood as the symbol of centuries of hatred. Governments in both countries have a sure-fire issue behind which they can unite their people, no matter how unpopular that government may be for domestic reasons. And the military equipment, amounting to some \$1½ billion in the case of Pakistan and \$200 million in the case of India, aid we furnished on assurances it would be used against Communist countries, made the war possible. We thought our anti-Communist interest in Asia so overriding that it must be overriding, too, with Indian and Pakistan. But it was not, even after India suffered a severe and humiliating defeat at the hands of China.

In the case of Pakistan, we knew for 10 years that the tanks and mobile equipment with which we were furnishing her army could not be used in the mountainous areas which separate her from both China and the Soviet Union. It could only be used in the plains and open country which separates her from India. Pakistan was never deceptive about this; her officials often pointed out that her army was not equipped, designed, or intended for mountain warfare.

But we made ourselves believe what we wanted to believe. We did not want to believe that American equipment would be used in an Indian-Pakistan war, so we continued the program in the face of all reason.

With American being abused by both sides for cutting off further aid, the best we could do was support a United Nations intervention. At the moment, it appears to be effective. But there are 40 million Moslems still in India and 10 million Hindus still in Pakistan. Both countries have a recent history of communal riot and slaughter. The

war can do nothing but exacerbate those feelings.

China has already profited from the folly produced by our shortsighted policy, for communism invariably makes its greatest gains in periods of war. China has greatly strengthened its ties with Pakistan, and it has seen the peace and stability of all of non-Communist Asia gravely weakened. India and Pakistan have never been interested in our problem in South Vietnam because they feared each other more than they feared communism.

FUTURE OF U.S. POLICY IN ASIA

In my opinion, our present policy in Asia can lead only into a vortex of failure and defeat for the United States. Its purpose is to do with China what we did with Russia—to surround her with a steel ring of military defense and political opposition that will prevent her expansion, in the hope and expectation that some day, as did Russia, she will understand that her own economic growth is more important to her people than war and she, too, will come to live by the doctrine of coexistence.

This great element lacking in Asia that was present in Europe is an overriding fear of communism. Political freedom and material wealth for the masses are almost unknown in Asia. Most of the new countries have no middle class, for which communism is the deadliest of all enemies, and against which the middle class will rally. Secondly, their religious and ethnic animosities are comparable to the religious wars of the Middle Ages that leveled vast areas of Europe and thwarted her progress for centuries. Communism is a relatively new threat to their religious traditions, and one they do not yet fear in the way they fear each other.

And, third, the new nations of Asia share an almost universal distrust of white intervention in their affairs. The United States has deep-seated problems between our white and colored people; but the idea of a foreign nation trying to impose its idea of a settlement upon us would be fought and resisted by all.

So we confront in Asia a situation where the overriding fear is directed more toward white intervention than toward communism. Communists are local people, native to each country. But Americans are foreigners, and even the individuals in a country like South Vietnam who are subsidized by the United States, become the target for local nationalists, be they Communists or not.

In South Vietnam, the more conspicuous our aid to Diem and his cohorts, the more local opposition arose to his rule. Today, South Vietnam has no government at all worthy of the name. What area remains out of Vietcong hands is occupied by the United States, either directly or by local army forces under the direction of American military officers.

With our firepower from aircraft carriers and from the Strategic Air Command, and with the buildup of our ground forces to 125,000, we can undoubtedly maintain ourselves in South Vietnam and perhaps even drive the Vietcong out of much of the country.

The net result will be another American enclave, like Korea, on the Asian continent, supported at a cost of half a billion a year and defended only by the continued presence of 50,000 U.S. troops.

It is said that the opponents of our Vietnam war have few alternatives on how to get the United States out without leaving the nation to the Communists; the advocates of the war have no proposal along these lines at all. They do not go beyond the idea of fighting to kill the Vietcong. How to leave the country after we have done that is not part of their doctrine because I think

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It is understood that we could not leave behind a pro-American government able to maintain itself without our military presence.

The more dependent these governments are upon us, the more vulnerable they become to local opposition, and if they are truly important to us, we are compelled to intervene with our military power to salvage the geography they occupy. This is a vicious circle the Chinese have avoided. Other than border wars, they have not sent a soldier outside their country; they give little economic or military aid support to any government. They rely upon propaganda, and they can do it because they are sounding an immensely popular and effective note which can be picked up and used by only a few local agitators to great advantage. In all respects, it is China that is the paper tiger in Asia. She talks big but does nothing, even to help the Vietcong. Yet her power and influence in Asia are growing simply because she has the advantage of being a large chunk of Asia, of being kin to millions of Chinese scattered throughout neighboring countries, and of being opposed by Americans who appear to be using Asians to do our work for us.

We are trying to counter Chinese expansion and influence with the wrong weapons.

We did not try to "contain" Russia until she had already occupied and established a ring of Communist-controlled nations around her borders. They are becoming buffers, as they break free somewhat from total Soviet control. China, too, will seek to establish the same buffers on her borders, and I question that it is possible for this country to prevent that from happening insofar as mainland Asia is concerned.

Second, during all our "containment" period we maintained diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. It was 16 years after the Bolsheviks took over before we recognized Russia, but once we did, we maintained relations with her throughout the worst of the cold war days. We found it desirable to have our own contacts with her and not have to rely upon third parties to transmit information and messages.

It is also 16 years since the Communists took over China, but we have not yet reached the stage of recognition. The French, British, and the Canadians remain the chief source of information about China for the American people, and although the State Department insists that it has many direct contacts with Chinese diplomats through third countries, it is deathly afraid of recognition because it is afraid of public reaction here at home.

Yet it is a problem we are going to have to face up to, if we hope to restrain the expansion of China without war, for there is an American interest to be served by direct assessment and judgment of Chinese interests and intentions. Never were our diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union more important, for example, than during the Cuban missile crisis.

Probably the lack of modern China experts in the State Department, too, is a reason why recognition is not in the offing, for after 16 years, the "old China hands" are those who were there in the days of Chiang Kai-shek.

The one place where we could begin facing up to this issue is where it is going to be forced on us, anyway—at the United Nations. I said in 1960, when I was a delegate, that as the nations voting to seat China grew, it would become desirable for the U.N. to undertake some negotiations with her to work out the future of Taiwan and to make certain that China respected the obligations and duties of U.N. membership. The addition of pro-Chinese Singapore to the U.N. will bring the vote on China very close to even, and unless we can prevail upon a majority to vote to require two-thirds for ad-

mission, China could very well be seated on her own terms.

It is true that there is a school of thought in the State and Defense Departments urging the destruction by American bombing of Chinese nuclear installations before any kind of political talks are held. But here again, such an act would, in my opinion, greatly enhance pro-Chinese sentiment in the continent.

Third, we must learn to deal with pro-Communist, and even Communist governments in Asia without seeing them all as tools of China per se. The new countries of Asia will spawn many leaders—some democratic, some Communists, and a great many mere opportunists, like Sukarno. But we must make note of what is the opportunistic line, and we surely know by now that anti-Americanism is one of the best. That should tell us a lot, whether or not we enjoy dealing with such leaders.

We do not have to support everyone with U.S. dollars; we do not have to have military alliances with everyone; we do not have to divide the world into enemies or allies. Many of these nations of Asia will never be allies or enemies of the United States. They will simply be trying to make their way through the terrible growing pains of economic development and absorption of hostile minorities. Democratic orientation will take a very long time, if it comes at all. But we can be satisfied with a General Ne Win in Burma who is socialist and anti-American. We can be satisfied with Prince Sihanouk, who is socialist, pro-Chinese, and anti-American. We become angry with those people, like Mayor Lee and Sukarno, who took large sums of American money and then, as we see it, turned on us. But I suggest they accepted our money for their reasons, not ours, and if we think they fell off the American bandwagon it was our shortsightedness to ever assume they were on it.

The only real restraint on China is going to be other strong states in Asia. One of them is Japan, and she already has a potential for leadership in Asia that could ease much of the burden on the United States. We probably would not like her leadership, because it already takes the form of increasing trade with China, and a growing disposition to achieve closer ties to China. Japan has tread softly in Asia because of the legacy of occupation days; but those memories are not altogether bad in many countries of the Far East and they are dissipating under the light of Japan's remarkable economic achievements.

India and Pakistan could serve as the continental counterbalance to China, but they will not if either is too dependent upon American financial or military support. Certainly we must maintain a "hands off" policy toward their current dispute, and join other nations in seeking to mediate the dispute directly or handle it through the United Nations.

Above all, we must get over the idea that America has some vital mission on the mainland of Asia. We must get over the concept that our "honor" is at stake in Vietnam, when we all know it is not our honor but a piece of geography that is at stake, and which our military people think would cause our string of offshore bases to be outflanked if it fell into Communist hands. It is already outflanked, and has become a highly vulnerable American outpost rather than any guardian of freedom. Our honor as a nation that observes its treaties and that abides by its own preachments about peaceful settlement of disputes is despoiled by our present policy.

We must also face the fact that however distasteful and frightening it is to us, China is no longer to be denied as a great power of the world. She has made herself a great power, she is a great power, and her in-

fluence among her neighbors will grow just as surely as did our influence in the Western Hemisphere when we became its biggest and wealthiest nation.

All the bombing of her nuclear installations that we could undertake will not reverse this process, and there is no land army that we can put in Asia that could overcome Chinese manpower of more than 700 million people. Moreover, her rise to this position is one source of her influence with other emerging nations. If she can do it, despite the lack of recognition for years by Western nations, and despite the military power the United States has devoted to curbing her influence in neighboring countries, new nations are encouraged by her example more than by ours.

There is going to have to be a basic rethinking in this country about Asia in general and China in particular. The Pacific can be an American lake only at the cost of eternal war. We are trying to hang on to the total control of the Pacific we gained in World War II, but it is inevitable that the nations on its western shore should regain control of its western shore. We have no generalized economic relations, or political relations, that take this into account. We have aid programs to those we regard as necessary to our military control, and we have military alliances with them. The others are treated and regarded as enemies.

In short, American nationalism vis-a-vis China has little to hope for by way of support in Asia. In my opinion, our best long-range hope in Asia is one that maintains correct relations with its member nations generally, without feeling that we must either give them aid or regard them as enemies. And it would rely far more than we rely today upon the original purposes and mechanisms of the United Nations. We proclaim our desire to see China and North Vietnam brought within the rule of law; but we act outside the rule of law in trying to force them to cease their lawbreaking. We have not so much as tried to use United Nations procedures in our war in Vietnam, even as we join in appeals for urgent United Nations action to stop the war in India.

The situation in Vietnam is no more beyond the powers of persuasions of the U.N. than the war in India, but we have not tried using it yet. It could be that the proposed Southeast Asia Development Bank could lead to some progress in showing us how to make economic bridges among the nations of Asia and eventually lead to political bridges. It is in this direction that peaceful restraint upon communism in Asia leads, not the direction of unilateral American military power.